sumber: Jurnal of Democracy Vol 15 No 1 Jan 2004 hal 109
Penulis:
Saiful Mujani
Direktur RisetHow strong is Islamism in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country? And what are the implications of that strength for the newly restored democracy, which in 2004 is slated to hold elections for the second time since the Suharto dictatorship fell in 1998? Journalistic observers often seem tentative or even puzzled in their assessments. In September 2003, for example, a New York Times article relayed that “some have begun to ask whether the Islamists who want to create a caliphate across the Muslim areas of Southeast Asia will at the very least eventually succeed in Indonesia.”1 Yet just a month earlier, the Times had dismissively portrayed a meeting of Islamic militants, intended as a show of strength. The gathering was sparsely attended, the paper reported, and “none of the invited mainstream politicians showed up.”
As the Times stories suggest, the behavior of Indonesia’s leading politicians is one of the main sources of confusion about the political strength of Islamism in the country. President Megawati Sukarnoputri, leader of the secular Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (PDI-P), rarely comments publicly on any issue, seeming especially concerned not to polarize the country by taking stands on religious questions. Vice-President Hamzah Haz, leader of the pro–Islamic-state United Development Party (PPP), is more than willing to speak his mind: When the foreign press expressed alarm that Islamist cleric Abubakar Baasyir was sentenced to only four years in prison for plotting to overthrow the state, Hamzah lept to Baasyir’s defense. “Who are the terrorists? America, that’s who. The U.S.’s war crimes in Iraq make it the king of terrorists.